2. People ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152 (1907) 
3. A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district court for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the property and to suppress for use as exidence anything so obtained on the ground that (1) the property was illegally seized without warrant, or (2) the warrant is insufficient on its face, or (3) the property seized is not that described in the warrant, or (4) there was not probable cause for believing the existence of the grounds on which the warrant was issued, or (5) the warrant was illegally executed. The judge shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion. If the the motion is granted the property shall be restored unless otherwise subject to lawful detention and it shall not be admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial. The motion to suppress evidence may also be made in the district where the trial is to be had. The motion shall be made before trial or hearing unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion, but the court in its discretion may entertain the motion at the trial or hearing. FED. R. Ciuim. P. 41(e).
4. Lagow v. United States, 159 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1946) , cert. denied, 321 U.S. 858 (1947) .
In 1960, the Supreme Court decided Jones v. United States, 5 the first full discussion of standing in a search and seizure case. That case declared that, in order to qualify as a "person aggrieved" by an unlawful search and seizure, one must have been the victim of a search and seizure, and that same person must be the one against whom the search was directed (as distinguished from one who was prejudiced only through the use of the evidence gathered as a result of a search and seizure directed at someone else). 6 Thus, Jones changed the requirement as to the necessary proprietary interest in the property seized or the premises searched. The proprietary interest requirement was greatly liberalized by removing the common law property concepts. Following Jones, anyone legitimately on the premises where a search occurs may challenge the legality of the search; 7 and, at least in cases where the indictment itself charges possession, 8 the accused may move to suppress the illegally seized evidence without asserting an interest in the property seized.9
The question of standing to object to illegally seized evidence has occupied attention of writers for many years.1o Since the important decision of Jones v. United States" much of the writers' concern has been directed toward examining the merits of the standing requirement,1 2 and toward predicting the consequences of the Jones decision. It is the purpose of this comment to determine the effect of the Jones decision on the issue of standing. 383 (1914) , which abandoned the common law rule that evidence was admissible in a criminal prosecution regardless of the method used to obtain it. Apparently, the common law rule was based on the theory that the police officers were answerable for their wrongful acts in separate proceedings. In Mapp v. Ohio 488, 491 (1965) . It is therefore of some concern to the states to determine whether the standing requirement is meritorious.
13. "Standing" problems should be distinguished from the problem of "primary taint." A standing problem arises when a defendant complains that prop- [Vol. 34 2 Missouri Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [1969] as to a passenger who asserted no proprietary or possessory interest in the car or contraband. Defendants who had borrowed a car from a third person had standing, based on a "possessory interest" in the contents of the car, to object to the illegal the search of it unreasonable. . . . Her supervisors could not reasonably search the desk for her purse, her personal letters, or anything else that did not belong to the government and had no connection with the work of the office. Their consent did not make such a search by the police reasonable. United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 , 1021 (D.C. Cir. 1951 Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [1969] , Art. 6 https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol34/iss4/6 COMMENTS seizure of property to which they denied ownership in United Sattes v. Chippa. 29 In State v. Green, 30 a Missouri case, an occupant of an automobile who disclaimed any interest in the automobile or the seized property was denied standing. The defendant was a passenger in an an automobile which was being driven by another with the owner's consent, and the driver gave permission for the search. The defendant was denied standing because "only the owner or the perosn in possession of the premises or property has any legal standing to complain of its violation." 3 '
Temporary guests were denied standing 32 to challenge the validity of searches and seizures because of insufficient proprietary interest. Heavy reliance was placed on common law property rules. Steeber v. United States, 198 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1952) .
37. Basing the right to object to illegally seized evidence on a proprietary interest in the property seized places the accused in a very delicate position when the evidence challenged tends to establish the charge of possession of contraband. If the accused denies that he was in possesison of the contraband, he would subsequently be denied standing to complain of an illegal search and seizure. On the other hand, if the accused admits the proprietary interest in the property, he has admitted to possession of the contraband. This "dilemma" is the basis of the very well-known statement of Judge Learned Hand: illegally seized evidence may arise, 38 but the examples given illustrate the narrow scope of standing in the cases prior to 1960. It is also apparent that, under the standing requirements, the victim of an illegal search, often the leader, might go free while his accomplices would be convicted on the basis of evidence illegally seized from the victim-leader.
1969]

III. JONES AND FOLLOWING
In the Jones case, District of Columbia police officers seized narcotics from a bird's nest on an outside awning of an apartment allegedly occupied by Jones and Richardson. Jones was present during the search, and he was charged with possession of narcotics. Jones had a key to the apartment, but claimed that it belonged to a friend and that he had stayed there "maybe a night." The district court overruled the motion to suppress on the ground the defendant had no standing. The court of appeals affirmed. 39 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the defendant Jones did have standing to object:
In cases where the indictment itself charges possession, the defendant in a very real sense is revealed as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" upon a motion to suppress evidence prior to trial.
40
Thus, the defendant need not allege a proprietary interest in the contraband, but only that the seized evidence will be used against him. In Contseras v. United States 41 defendants who were charged with possession
Men may wince at admitting they were the owners, or in possession, of contraband property; may wish at once to secure the remedies of a possessor, and avoid the perils of the part; but equivocation will not serve. If they come as victims, they must take on that role, with enough detail to cast them without question. The petitioners at bar shrank from that predicament, but they were obliged to choose one horn of the dilemma. Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629, 650 (2d Cir. 1932 257, 264 (1960) . The Jones Court addressed itself directly to the contradictory positions of the prosecution which charged possession of the narcotics by the defendant, and yet, on the motion to suppress, contdnded that the defendant should be denied relief because he did not possess it:
The prosecution here thus subjected the defendant to the penalties meted out to one in lawless possession while refusing him the remedies designed for one in that situation. It is not consonant with the amenities, to put it mildly, of the administration of criminal justice to sanction such squarely contradictory assertions of power by the government. [Vol. 34 6 Missouri Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [1969] , Art. 6 https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol34/iss4/6 COMMENTS of narcotics had standing to object-based on the Jones case. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's finding of lack of standing, recognizing that a charge based upon possession of narcotics, by that fact alone, confers standing on the defendant. Where possession of the seized property is not charged, but is highly incriminating, courts have reached different results. In State v. Konigsberg 2 the exception which grants standing for crimes of possession was held to apply only when possession per se constitutes a crime. But in a case where the defendant was charged with a wagering violation and the government based its case on two envelopes allegedly taken from defendant's possession, the defendant was held to have standing to object, notwithstanding the fact that he denied possession.
3
In addition to providing an exception for crimes of possession, Jones greatly extended the scope of "person aggrieved" in regard to the necessary proprietary interest in the premises searched to convey standing:
No just interest of the Government in the effective and vigorous enforcement of the criminal law will be hampered by recognizing that anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress, when its fruits are proposed to be used against him. This would of course not avail those who, by virtue of their wrongful presence, cannot invoke the privacy of the premises searched. 44 The "legitimately on the premises" rule is a most significant aspect of Jones since private property law is thereby eliminated as a test to determine standing. The Court rejected all "subtle distinctions" of proprietary interest. 45 Actually, it seems that the only persons present when the search is made who would have no standing would be the persons who entered the premises unlawfully. One who entered the premises to commit a crime, without the consent of the owner, such as a burglar or car thief, would presumably be denied standing. In State v. Keeling 46 guests who were engaged with the hostess in numbers operations were held not to have standing to object because their presence on the premises was not for a legitimate purpose. Clearly a showing of personal interest is still an essential element in invoking the privacy of the premises, but the greatly expanded scope of personal interest in searched premises should result in greater protection from unlawful searches and seizures.
Since employees are "legitimately on premises" where a search occurs, they likely have standing to object to evidence proposed to be used against them that was illegally seized from the employer's premises. In addition, the elimination of common law property rules and "subtle distinctions" should result in different decisions in those cases which held that employees lacked standing be-42. 336 F.2d 844 (3rd Cir. 1964 7 union papers were seized from De Forte's office, one large room shared by De Forte with others. At the time of the seizure, De Forte had custody of the papers, but they belonged to the union. The Supreme Court held that De Forte had fourth amendment standing to object; the fact of a "group" office did not matter. The Court stated that the capacity to claim the protection of the amendment, while not depending upon a property right in the premises, does depend upon whether the area was one in which there was reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion.
8
The corporate officers' and shareholders' right to object to unlawful seizure of corporate property seems also to have been expanded. In Mancusi the defendant was a vice-president of the union whose papers were seized. Most narrowly, Mancusi confers standing on an officer of an organization (or business) who was legitimately on the searched premises at the time of the search and from whose custody the corporate property was taken. Whether the case will be read more broadly 49 is a question that will have to'be answered in future cases in view of the undefined language of the "test."
50
Cases involving searches of automobiles have been affected by Jones to the extent that standing no longer depends upon a claim of ownership or possession of the car or seized property. 51 The pre-Jones cases denying standing to in- Cir. 1950) , defendant was the sole shareholder and president of the corporation. Corporate books and records were seized from the personal office of the defendant in his absence. The court concluded that Jones set forth no formula to determine the question of standing and that each case must be decided on its facts by comparing the defendant's interest with the interest of the defendant in Jones:
Since the Supreme Court has not provided us with a precise and unequivocal definition of an "aggrieved person" under Rule 41(e), we can best measure appellant's standing to suppress the illegally obtained evidence by comparing his interest with the interest of the defendant in Jones. This is not to say that every employee of a corporation can attack the illegal seizure of corporate property if the fruits of the search are proposed to be used against him. Each case must be decided on its own facts. Hanzel v. United States supra, at 653. Thus, the right of corporate officers and shareholders to object has broadened greatly, but each case will have to be decided on its own facts to determine whether or not there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from intrusion.
50. " [W] hether the area was one in which there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion." Mancusi v. DeForte, U.S. 364, 368 (1968) . 51. A passenger in an automobile, "legitimately on the premises," would have standing to object to evidence seized from the car. In United States v. Festa, 192 F. Supp. 160 (D.C. Mass. 1960) , the defendant was the driver of a car which was stopped and searched. The defendant had standing to object to evidence seized from the car even though he was not the owner of the car or its contents. He had been given possession of the car by its owner and he was therefore legitimately on the premises. The defendant will not be denied standing to object [Vol. 34 8 Missouri Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [1969] , Art. 6 https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol34/iss4/6 COMMENTS vitees, licensees and guests have been specifically rejected by Jones: "Distinctions such as those between 'lessee,' 'licensee,' 'invitee,' and 'guest,' often only of gossamer strength, ought not to be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards." 52 The single test is whether one is "legitimately on the premises," and, although liberal, even that test may not encompass a lessor who has divested himself of possession and use of the premises.
5 3
Missouri cases since Jones differ little in terminology from their pre-Jones counterparts. In State v. Anderson 54 the defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree. Evidence was seized from an apartment in which his mother lived.
There was a conflict in evidence as to whether the defendant also resided there. The court found the evidence warranted a finding that he did not reside in the apartment and standing was denied. 55 The court specifically distinguished the Jones case on the basis that the instant case did not involve a possessory crime. However, State v. Stuart 56 did involve a possessory crime. The defendant was convicted of possession of instruments for the unauthorized use of narcotic drugs. Evidence was seized from an apartment in which defendant was lawfully present, having the permission of one of the two owners. The second owner authorized the search. Although defendant relied on Jones to establishh standing, the court found that the question of the extent to which an owner's consent can override an objection of one lawfully on the premises was not discussed in Jones. Standing was thus denied a defendant accused of a possessory crime who was "legitimately on the premises."
57
Recent cases involving the search of an automobile in Missouri do not rely on the Jones principle of "legitimately on the premises." Rather, the cases repeat the phraseology of the pre-Jones cases which require either ownership or possession of the vehicle or the property seizd. The Missouri courts continue to insist upon the requirement of a personal interest in the property seized or a proprietary interest in the premises searcled, regardless of whether the crime is possessory, or the defendant is legitimately on the premises.
62
IV. STANDING
There are proponents of the standing requirement and there are those who oppose imposing such limitations on the exclusionary rule of evidence.
63
Those who favor the standing requirement state, first, that police officers are concerned with the proper and lawful enforcement of the law; that police officers would not invade the rights of third persons in searches and seizures. In addition, it is harmful to society to encourage a policy that would result in guilty men being free from conviction because of some minor technicality in the search warrant, or some miscalculation in the nebulous area of probable cause. Further, the proponents argue, standing is required in challenging all violations of constitutional provisions. And, finally, there is no need to eliminate the requirement of standing because the trend is to accommodate goals of public policy by defining the limits of standing to meet those needs.
Opponents of the standing requirements answer that it is wrong to allow the government to use illegally seized evidence to convict a man. If it is wrong for the government to use such evidence, they should be deterred from even seizing the evidence illegally. In many situations, the police will make little effort to make a lawful search and seizure if the fruits can be used against third persons. The result would be increased invasion of the rights of third persons and little or no deterrent effect on the police officers. The fourth amendment can only be enforced fully by protecting potential victims from infringement through deterring unlawful searches and seizures. It is likely, say the opponents, 77 (1964) ; Comment, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 488, 514-515. The Jones opinion expressly states that it is an interpretation of Rule 41(e), and therefore the court's discussion of standing rules is only applicable to the lower federal courts. But standing determines who has the privilege to enforce the fourth amendment, and the fourth amendment is enforced by excluding evidence that is obtained as a result of unreasonable searches and seizures. This exclusionary rule was made applicable to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) . Thus, states, too, may have to formulate some principle to determine who may enforce the fourth amendment by excluding illegally seized evidence. that guilty men go free. But the society's benefit outweighs the harm; the rights of innocent persons must be protected. One of the strongest arguments against the standing requirements has recently been eliminated. Even under the liberalized standing requirements of Jones, there are many situations in which a defendant's testimony is necessary to establish standing to object to illegally seized evidence in asserting his fourth amendment claim for exclusion. Under the rules of lower courts, 65 the defendant assumed the risk that the testimony would later be used against him at trial. This dilemma was eliminated for possessory crimes in Jones, but in other cases the defendant could either admit the connection with the incriminating evidence at the hearing for exclusion and risk later admission at trial, or he could refuse to admit the connection and have the evidence admitted at trial. Only occasional and more flagrant abuses come to the attention of the courts, and then only where the search and seizure yields incriminating evidence and the defendant is at least sufficiently compromised to be indicted. If the officers raid a home, an office, or stop and search an automobile but find nothing incriminating, this invasion of the personal liberty of the innocent too often finds no practical redress. . . . Courts can protect the innocent against such invasions only indirectly and through the medium of excluding evidence obtained against those who frequently are guilty. 65. The rationale for admitting the testimony after the motion to suppress has failed is that it is relevant and freely given. Following a successful motion, the testimony was excluded as "fruit" of an unlawful search. Safarik v There is certainly no language in the Fourth Amendment which gives support to any such device to hobble law enforcement in this country. While our Constitution does provide procedural safeguards to protect defendants from arbitrary convictions, that governmental charter holds out no promises to stultify justice by erecting barriers to the admissibility of relevant evidence voluntarily given in a court of justice. Under the first principles of ethics and morality a defendant who secures a court order by telling the truth should not be allowed to seek a court advantage later based on a premise directly opposite to his solemn judicial oath. This Court should not lend its high name to such a justice-defeating stratagem. Id. at 398-399.
